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I. INTRODUCTION

Severely brain damaged patients represent major ethical and legal
challenges in end-of-life care. In particular, the vegetative state has featured
significantly in the origins and evolution of the “right to die” movement. The
first significant end-of-life case was Quinlan, where the New Jersey Supreme
Court, citing Quinlan’s constitutional right to privacy, permitted her father to
*
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withdraw her ventilator. 1 The right to die movement reached its apex in
1990, when in Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court assumed (without
deciding) that an incompetent person had a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing life-prolonging treatment.2 The politically contentious
Schiavo case engendered a national discussion about the appropriateness of
withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration at the end of life.3 These three
seminal cases featured young women in a “persistent” vegetative state and
defined the boundaries of the right to withhold or withdraw treatment from
those with severely impaired consciousness.
The Quinlan case, in particular, marked a turning point, as it allowed
physicians, courts, legislatures, and the public to view the vegetative state as
a meaningless, bleak existence of irreversible unconsciousness, justifying the
decision to forego life-sustaining treatment.
Recently, however,
sophisticated neuroimaging studies have challenged the decades-old
assumption that all vegetative patients lack capacity for conscious thought.
The evolving science has promise to transform the evaluation and treatment
of patients in a vegetative state and its related disorder of consciousness—the
minimally conscious state.
II. DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Disorders of consciousness arise from severe brain injury most
commonly caused by massive head trauma or a nontramautic event such as a
cardiac arrest that results in an anoxic injury to the brain.4 Consciousness has
two main components: the level of consciousness, which includes
wakefulness or arousal, and the content of consciousness, which is
awareness.5 Awareness can be divided into awareness of self and awareness
of the environment.6 After a serious brain insult, one or both of these
components may be compromised, leading to a disorder of consciousness.
Severe disorders of consciousness include coma, the vegetative state, and the
minimally conscious state.

1

In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2
Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279–80 (1990).
3
See, e.g., Terry Schiavo’s life, death sparked national debate, CNN U.S. News,
March 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/03/31/obit.schiavo/ (last visited Feb. 25,
2013); see also Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 332 (Fla. 2004) (holding that statute
authorizing governor to issue a stay of the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from a
vegetative patient was unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine).
4
JAMES L BERNAT, ETHICAL ISSUES IN NEUROLOGY 288, 295 (3d ed. 2008).
5
Steve Majerus et al., Behavioral Evaluation of Consciousness in Severe Brain
Damage, 150 PROG. BRAIN RES. 397, 397 (2005), available at http://espra.risc.cnrs.fr
/majerus_PBR_vol150_397_413.pdf.
6
Id.
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A. Coma
Coma is a state of unwakefulness (eyes-closed) and unawareness.7
Patients in a coma are unable to be aroused with stimuli.8 It is usually a
temporary, acute state that can last days to weeks.9 Patients may devolve
from coma to brain death, which is defined as the irreversible cessation of all
functions of the brain,10 or may fully recover to a conscious state. In other
cases, recovery may not advance beyond a severe disability with little or no
consciousness.
B. Vegetative State
What Patients may emerge from coma into a condition of
“wakefulness without awareness,” or the vegetative state (VS).11 Patients in
a VS, unlike those who are brain dead, have preserved or partially preserved
hypothalamic and brain stem functions necessary for survival.12 They open
their eyes and often breathe on their own but, due to loss of cortical or higher
brain function, are incapable of purposeful, voluntary, reproducible
movement in response to stimuli.13 When stimuli-induced, vegetative
patients exhibit only reflex or automatic movements, such as posturing in
response to pain or eye-opening when subjected to a loud noise.14 Many
individuals in this condition live for an extended period of time as long as
they receive sustenance; they are not terminally ill.15
The term persistent vegetative state was coined in 1972 by Jennett
and Plum to describe patients whose “vegetative, mindless state” lasted
longer than a few weeks.16 In 1994, the Multi-Society Task Force on PVS
defined the temporal boundaries of the vegetative state.17 The persistent
vegetative state was deemed permanent if it lasted more than three months
7
Steven Laureys et al., Brain Function in Coma, Vegetative State, and Related
Disorders, 3 LANCET NEUROLOGY, 537, 538 (2004).
8
Luaba Tshibanda et al., Neuroimaging After Coma, 52 NEURORADIOLOGY 15,
15 (2010).
9
Id.
10
UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 781 (2008).
11
Bryan Jennett & Fred Plum, Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage: A
Syndrome in Search of a Name, 1 LANCET 734, 734 (1972).
12
The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent
Vegetative State (1), 330 N. ENG. J. MED 1499, 1500 (1994).
13
Id.
14
Joseph J. Fins et al., Neuroimaging and Disorders of Consciousness:
Envisioning an Ethical Research Agenda, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 4 (2008).
15
American Academy of Neurology, Position of the American Academy of
Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State
Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 125, 125 (1989).
16
Jennett & Plum, supra note 11, at 736.
17
The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent
Vegetative State (2), 330 N. ENG. J. MED 1572, 1575 (1994).
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for those patients with nontraumatic brain injury and more than twelve
months for those with traumatic brain injury.18 The Task Force concluded
that recovery after these times was rare and almost always involved moderate
to severe disability.19
There has been criticism of the semantics surrounding the vegetative
state. Some clinicians object to the term “vegetative”20 because in the minds
of many lay people (and some professionals), it implies the patient is a
“vegetable” and therefore, subhuman.21 For that reason, the European Task
Force on Disorders of Consciousness recently recommended that the term
vegetative state be changed to “unresponsive wakefulness syndrome”
(UWS).22 Further, PVS, an abbreviation for persistent vegetative state, is
often confused as the acronym for permanent vegetative state, leading some
groups and authors to avoid the terms persistent or permanent when referring
to the vegetative state.23 Finally, many clinicians use the terms persistent and
permanent interchangeably.24 However, persistent is a diagnosis of a
disability of uncertain duration, while permanent is a prognosis and implies
irreversibility.25 For these reasons, many neurologists simply describe the
syndrome as the vegetative state or VS, a term that will be used in this
article.
There is also some confusion in legal and medical circles as to the
implications of a VS diagnosis. Although by definition, VS patients are
unaware and lack the ability to perceive pain,26 some courts have allowed
juries to award damages to VS patients for conscious pain and suffering.27
18

Id.
Id.
20
The term vegetative was chosen as it refers to the preserved vegetative
functions of patients, including sleep-wake cycles, respiration, digestion, and
thermoregulation. Marie-Aurélie Bruno et al., From Unresponsive Wakefulness to Minimally
Conscious PLUS and Functional Locked-In Syndromes: Recent Advances in Our
Understanding of Disorders of Consciousness, 258 J. NEUROLOGY 1373, 1373–74 (2011).
21
Id. at 1374 (noting tendency of laypersons to use the word “vegetable” to refer
to those with severe disorders of consciousness); see also BERNAT, supra note 4 at 288
(opining that “the term ‘vegetative’ was an unfortunate choice because of its unintended
similarity to the pejorative term ‘vegetable’ . . . .”).
22
Steven Laureys et al., Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome: A New Name for
the Vegetative State or Apallic Syndrome, 8 BMC MEDICINE 68, 69 (2010), available at
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1741-7015-8-68.pdf.
23
See Olivia Gosseries et al., Disorders of Consciousness: What’s in a Name?, 28
NEUROREHABILITATION 3, 4 (2011) (preferring to avoid use of the terms persistent of
permanent); see also BERNAT, supra note 4 at 289 (stating that it is best to avoid the modifier
persistent or permanent when referring to the vegetative state).
24
BERNAT, supra note 4 at 288.
25
The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, supra note 12 at 1501.
26
See American Academy of Neurology, supra note 15 at 125 (stating that VS
patients cannot experience pain).
27
See, e.g., Banks ex rel. Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 64 (Nev. 2004)
(allowing the jury to award damages for conscious pain and suffering of a patient in a
persistent vegetative state based on a nurse’s testimony that the patient was able to respond to
his environment); Maracle v. Curcio, 806 N.Y.S.2d 839, 840–841 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)
19
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Other courts have referred to vegetative patients as comatose,28 or terminally
ill29 (although most are not). And it is not unusual for misunderstandings to
exist about the difference between the VS and brain death,30 even among
neurologists.31 Although the nomenclature in this area is confused, the
essence of the permanent VS is thought to be state of total
unconsciousness—of nothingness—from which no return is possible.
C. Minimally Conscious State
Patients may emerge from coma or may transition from the VS to a
state of partial awareness, known as the minimally conscious state (MCS).32
The condition of partial consciousness has been observed for years, but the
diagnostic criteria for MCS were developed only a decade ago by the Aspen
Neurobehavioral Conference.33 The MCS is defined as a syndrome in which
the person has intermittent but reproducible evidence of discernible
awareness of self or the environment.34 Behaviors exhibited by patients in
MCS include following simple commands, gesturing or verbalizing yes or no
to questions, manipulating objects, purposeful blinking or smiling (not
reflexive), or intelligible verbalization.35 MCS may also be categorized by
the level of behavioral responses: MCS+ describes higher functioning
patients, while MCS- refers to minimal or low-level responses.36

(affirming trial court’s refusal to dismiss claim for conscious pain and suffering because the
patient, “although in a vegetative state, had the requisite level of awareness necessary for such
an award”).
28
See, e.g., People v. Haley, 960 N.E.2d 670, 677 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (citing
evidence that if the patient had survived, he would have been in a “comatose vegetative
state”); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 582 (D. R.I. 1988) (describing a persistent
vegetative state patient as being in “a type of comatose state”).
29
See, e.g., In re AB, 768 N.Y.S.2d 256, 272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (referring to
infant in a persistent vegetative state as terminally ill).
30
See, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense Of the
Special Law Enacted By Congress and President Bush, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 151, 154 (2006)
(criticizing the failure of the courts in the Schiavo case to order brain scans because “there was
no hard evidence that Mrs. Schiavo was truly brain-dead at the time that tube was removed.”).
31
See Ari R. Joffe et al., A Survey of American Neurologists About Brain Death:
Understanding the Conceptual Basis and Diagnostic Tests for Brain Death, 2 ANNALS OF
INTENSIVE
CARE
1,
3
(2012),
available
at
http://www.annalsofintensivecare.com/content/pdf/2110-5820-2-4.pdf (reporting that almost
half of neurologists surveyed understood brain death as the loss of higher brain functions or
permanent loss of consciousness).
32
J.T. Giacino et al., The Minimally Conscious State Definition and Diagnostic
Criteria,
58
NEUROLOGY
349,
349–351
(2002),
available
at
http://www.neurology.org/content/58/3/349.full.
33
Id. at 350.
34
Id. at 351.
35
Id.
36
Bruno, supra note 20, at 1373.
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D. Locked-in Syndrome
Locked-in syndrome (LIS) is not a disorder of consciousness, but
may appear as one.37 A person with LIS has preserved consciousness
without the ability to move or communicate, except, in most cases, by
voluntary vertical eye movements and blinking.38 The locked-in syndrome
was brought to the public’s attention in Jean-Dominique Bauby’s
autobiographical work, The Diving Bell and the Butterfly.39 Bauby, who was
in LIS and fully conscious, wrote the book one letter at a time by blinking his
left eye.40
The classical locked-in state is characterized by total immobility
that prevents movement or speech, preserved cognitive functioning, and a
code for communicating that uses eye movements or blinking.41 In some
patients, the syndrome is considered incomplete because the patient has some
remnants of voluntary motion.42 Total LIS occurs in the presence of complete
immobility, including eye movements.43
E. Diagnostic Challenges
Differentiating between these three syndromes is very challenging,
particularly in those patients who have limited or inconsistent motor ability
from which consciousness may be inferred.44 Studies performed during the
past two decades confirm that standard clinical diagnosis of the vegetative
state may be erroneous in more than forty percent of patients.45 The high rate
37

See Caroline Schnakers et al., Detecting Consciousness In a Total Locked-In
Syndrome: An Active Event-Related Paradigm, 15 NEUROCASE 271, 272 (2009) (noting that
difficulties in diagnosis of LIS occur because of behavioral similarities to VS).
38
Nick Chisholm & Grant Gillett, The Patient’s Journey: Living With Locked-In
Syndrome, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 94, 95–96 (2005).
39
JEAN-DOMINIQUE BAUBY, THE DIVING BELL AND THE BUTTERFLY: A MEMOIR
OF LIFE IN DEATH (Jeremy Leggatt trans., Vintage International 1997).
40
Steven Laureys et al., The Locked-In Syndrome: What Is It Like To Be
Conscious But Paralyzed and Voiceless?, in 150 PROG. BRAIN RES. 495, 497 (Steven Laureys
ed.,
2005),
available
at
http://www.coma.ulg.ac.be/papers/
LIS/2005_PBR
_vol150_495_511.pdf.
41
Id.at 497.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Steven Laureys et al., supra note 7, at 537.
45
See Caroline Schnakers et al., Diagnostic Accuracy of the Vegetative and
Minimally Conscious State: Clinical Consensus Versus Standardized Neurobehavioral
Assessment, 9 BMC NEUROLOGY 35 (2009), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/14712377/9/35 (finding forty-one percent of VS patients to be in MCS); Keith Andrews et al.,
Misdiagnosis of the Vegetative State: Retrospective Study in a Rehabilitation Unit, 313 BRIT.
MED. J. 13, 14 (1996) (concluding that forty-three percent of patients in VS were
misdiagnosed); Nancy L. Childs et al., Accuracy of Diagnosis of Persistent Vegetative State,
43 NEUROLOGY 1465, 1466 (1993) (reporting that thirty-seven percent of those labeled in VS
had some level of awareness); Donald D. Tresch et al., Clinical Characteristics of Patients in

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/5

6

Harrington: Advances in Neuroimaging

2013]

ADVANCES IN NEUROIMAGING

219

of diagnostic errors has persisted despite improved behavioral testing
standards.46 In most of these cases, patients are found to be in MCS rather
than VS, but some misdiagnosed patients are in LIS.47
“Consciousness is at the heart of the distinction” between the
vegetative, minimally conscious, and locked-in, states.48 There is, however,
no objective test for measuring consciousness.49 Diagnostic errors occur
because the examiner can only infer the lack of awareness in a person by
observation of the person’s behavior and the ability to signal consciousness
through motor or verbal responses.50 Distinguishing VS from MCS depends
on “meaningful” or “purposeful” responses to commands or stimuli, terms
that require subjective interpretation on the part of the examiner.51 There are
multiple bedside assessment tools used for diagnosing the level of
consciousness, some of which are less reliable than others.52
Patients with disorders of consciousness may confuse examiners
because of temporal conditions such as sedative medication.53 Many of the
misdiagnosed may be blind or severely visually impaired, making it difficult
to assess purposeful eye tracking.54 Others may be deaf or hearing-impaired,
confounding verbal command testing.55 Finally, the examiner’s and treatment
team’s experience, skill, and length of assessment affect their ability to draw
accurate conclusions from the patient’s behavior.56
the Persistent Vegetative State, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 930, 930 (1991) (concluding
that eighteen percent of those diagnosed in the persistent vegetative state were aware of
themselves or their environment).
46
See Gosseries, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that despite the publication of
diagnostic criteria for VS and MCS, the high rate of diagnostic error has not changed).
47
See Laureys et al., supra note 40, at 499–500 (describing two poignant cases
where LIS patients were mistakenly diagnosed in the vegetative state).
48
Martha Farah, That Little Matter of Consciousness, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 17, 17
(2009).
49
Majerus, supra note 5, at 397. Further, there is a debate in neurology about the
nature of consciousness itself. See Carl E. Fisher & Paul S. Appelbaum, Diagnosing
Consciousness, Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 374,
375 (2010) (explaining that although there are established criteria for impaired consciousness,
there is little agreement on what defines consciousness).
50
Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, supra note 12, at 1501; see also Majerus,
supra note 5, at 398 (“Clinically, we are limited to the appraisal of the patient’s capacity to
perceive the external world and to voluntarily interact with it (i.e., perceptual awareness.)”);
Martin M. Monti et al., Neuroimaging and the Vegetative State Resolving the Behavioral
Assessment Dilemma?, 1157 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 81, 83 (2009) (stating that the
differentiation between consciousness and unconsciousness is the ability of the patient to
signal awareness).
51
Majerus et al., supra note 5, at 399.
52
See generally id. at 402–11 (describing a number of tests used to assess
consciousness).
53
Monti et al., supra note 50, at 85 (noting that diagnostic errors can occur due to
the failure to exclude such factors as sedatives, range of motion, posture, and nutrition).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Majerus et al., supra note 5, at 401–02.
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In patients who have complete LIS and who are immobile (except
perhaps for blinking and eye movements) and unable to speak, preservation
of consciousness is often difficult to detect at the bedside.57 Discerning
purposeful eye blinking from spontaneous or reflex eye blinking requires
repeated observation under different conditions.58 In patients with total LIS
without eye movements, rates of misdiagnosis may be particularly high.59
Without careful surveillance, locked-in patients may be mistakenly
considered to be in a vegetative or minimally conscious state.60
Further, once labeled with the term vegetative, it is frequently
difficult to change the diagnosis as caretakers may not notice subtle changes
in the level of consciousness.61 One well-publicized case demonstrates the
tenacity of the VS label. Nineteen years after a traumatic brain injury, Terry
Wallis began to speak.62 During those years, Wallis was described as being
in a VS.63 A subsequent review of his medical records showed that he had
emerged from VS to MCS.64 Interestingly, scientists later discovered axonal
regrowth in Wallis’ brain, indicating that such regrowth may play a role in
late recovery of function in patients with severe brain injuries.65
F. Prognosis
Studies have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between
these three states because of the differing potential for patient improvement.
While unresponsive patients in the VS have been thought to have little to no
chance of recovery after one year, there are no such temporal boundaries for
improvement or recovery for those in MCS.66 Patients with MCS have
significantly more favorable outcomes than patients in the VS, particularly
those with traumatic brain injuries.67 Although many MCS patients will
57
Chisolm & Gillett, supra note 38, at 95–96; see also Laureys, supra note 40, at
499 (noting that in a majority of cases, it is a relative of the LIS patient and not the physician
who first realizes the patient is conscious and able to communicate through eye movements).
58
Majerus et al., supra note 5, at 400.
59
Schnakers et al. supra note 37, at 272.
60
Laureys et al., supra note 40, at 499.
61
Bruno et al., supra note 20, at 1374.
62
Joseph J. Fins, Neuroethics, Neuroimaging, and Disorders of Consciousness:
Promise or Peril?, 122 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 336, 341
(2010).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Giancino et al., supra note 32, at 352 (declaring that it is not known how many
patients will emerge from MCS more than one year post-injury).
67
Id.; see also Dominic Wilkinson & Julian Savulescu, Is It Better To Be
Minimally Conscious Than Vegetative?, J. MED. ETHICS (2012), available at
http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2012/08/31/medethics-2012-100954.short
(citing studies
showing that half of MCS patients developed signs of functional recovery by 12 months and
that one-third of patients who had been in MCS more than one year showed continued
improvement over the next five years).

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/5

8

Harrington: Advances in Neuroimaging

2013]

ADVANCES IN NEUROIMAGING

221

remain in MCS with severe disabilities, others may progress to a state where
they can functionally communicate.68
The prognosis of patients with LIS varies with the extent of the brain
lesion.69 Some patients with locked-in syndrome may exhibit good functional
outcomes, including limited motor recovery, with the benefit of
rehabilitation.70 In these LIS patients, a misdiagnosis of VS or MCS can be
particularly harmful, delaying or depriving conscious individuals of adequate
therapeutic measures designed to provide a useful recovery and improved
quality of life.71
G. Pain Perception
The importance of distinguishing between these disorders also
relates to patients’ perception of pain. Pain is thought to be a phenomenon of
the conscious state.72 LIS patients are conscious and can experience pain.
Those patients in a VS or MCS pose a challenge for clinicians determining
the patient’s level of pain perception solely through behavior assessments.73
Patients in a VS are thought to be unable to perceive pain and are not
routinely administered potent analgesics, even when end-of-life care is
withdrawn.74 There are no guidelines for the treatment of pain in MCS
patients,75although there have been recommendations to treat all MCS
patients with analgesics since they have, by definition, some evidence of the
ability to be conscious of pain.76

68

Laureys, supra note 7, at 539.
José León-Carrión et al., The Locked-In Syndrome: A Syndrome Looking for a
Therapy, 16 BRAIN INJURY 571, 579 (2002) (stating that LIS caused by traumatic damages to
the brain stem may be transient and portend a better prognosis than LIS that is secondary to an
occlusion of the basilar artery).
70
Id. at 578.
71
Id. at 575; see also Laureys et al., supra note 40, at 499 (reporting average
delays in diagnosis of LIS patients of seventy-eight days; several patients were not correctly
diagnosed for more than four years).
72
See American Academy of Neurology, supra note 15, at 125 (stating that VS
patients lack the capacity to experience pain and suffering); see also Nada Gligorov,
Unconscious Pain, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 27, 27 (2008) (describing the standard view that “pain
(is) an exclusively conscious state . . . .”).
73
See Mélanie Boly et al., Perception of Pain In the Minimally Conscious State
With PET Activation: An Observational Study, 7 LANCET NEUROLOGY 1013, 1013 (2008),
available at
http://www.coma.ulg.ac.be/papers/vs/Pain_MCS_LancetNeuro08.pdf.
74
See Fins, supra note 14, at 8 (stating that pain treatment is not generally used in
VS patients, and that Schiavo died without receiving strong opiates).
75
Boly et al., supra note 73, at 1013.
76
Boly et al., supra note 73, at 1018 (“[T]he results of the study should prompt
the use of analgesics in patients in MCS . . . .”).
69
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III. RECENT ADVANCES IN NEUROIMAGING
Neuroimaging holds promise as an aid in diagnosing disorders of
consciousness, principally in those who are unable to produce any
meaningful behavioral response.77 In particular, positron emission
tomography (PET),78 and, more recently, functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI),79 have been used in an attempt to assess the level of
cognition of patients with serious brain disorders and to distinguish the VS
from the MCS. Functional neuroimaging is distinguished from structural
imaging, such as computer tomography (CT) or traditional MRI scans, which
produce only pictures of the brain.80 Functional brain scans measure the
brain’s activity both at rest and in response to commands.81
Using electrophysiology, alone or in conjunction with fMRI, also
shows promise in both the differential diagnosis and prognosis of disorders
of consciousness.82 Electrophysiological measures such as evoked potentials
(EPs)83
and
event-related
potentials
(ERPs)84
derived
from
electroencephalography (EEG) may have a role in detecting covert
awareness in impaired patients.85 Using this technology to assess
consciousness may have even wider application in clinical practice as EEGs
have been used at the bedside for many years.
Brain imaging studies during the past decade have challenged
assumptions about the diagnostic categories of disorders of consciousness
and their immutability.86 Although a number of studies utilizing these
techniques have been performed over the past decade, only selected case
reports will be described.87

77

See Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of
Consciousness, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 588 (2010) (asserting that neuroimaging is most
helpful in those who exhibit no motor response evidencing awareness).
78
Positron emission tomography (PET) measures the metabolic activity in the
brain after the patient has been administered radioactive elements. Fisher & Appelbaum,
supra note 49, at 376.
79
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) records changes in blood
oxygenation in the brain using magnetic fields. Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 49, at 376.
80
Jodie R. Gawryluk et al., Improving the Clinical Assessment of Consciousness
With Advances in Electrophysiological and Neuroimaging Techniques, 10 BMC NEUROLOGY
1, 3 (2010), available at http://biomedcentral.com/1471-2377/10/11.
81
Tshibanda et al., supra note 8, at 18.
82
Gawryluk et al., supra note 80, at 6.
83
Evoked potentials refer to basic sensory processing responses seen on EEG
recordings. Gawryluk et al., supra note 80, at 3.
84
Event-related potentials are used to assess higher-level cognitive functions,
such as memory or language. Gawryluk et al., supra note 80, at 3.
85
Gawryluk et al., supra note 80, at 1-2 (suggesting that electrophysiology
addresses the need for better diagnosis of consciousness).
86
Fins et al., supra note 14, at 4.
87
For a summary of other studies, see Bruno et al., supra note 20, at 1381-82,
Table 3.
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A. Functional Neuroimaging to Detect Covert Awareness
In 2006, Adrian Owen and colleagues published a provocative report
that appeared to demonstrate the ability of a VS patient to respond to
auditory commands.88 A twenty-three year old woman in a VS for five
months was asked to imagine playing tennis and walking through her
home.89 On fMRI, there was significant activation in the same areas of the
brain observed in healthy volunteers asked to perform the same tasks.90 The
authors concluded that the responses of the patient “confirmed beyond any
doubt that she was aware of herself and her surroundings.”91
An even more compelling fMRI study was reported in 2010 with
fifty-four subjects, twenty-three who were in a VS and thirty-one in an
MCS.92 The patients were evaluated on their performance of motor and
spatial imagery tasks against healthy controls.93 The investigators found five
subjects who were able to willfully modulate their brain activity in ways that
closely matched the pattern of healthy controls, indicating preserved, but
undetected, awareness.94 Of the five that exhibited such responses, four had
been diagnosed in a VS for periods ranging from two months to five years.95
After further clinical assessment, two of these patients were found to show
some signs of functional response, indicating a diagnosis of MCS.96 Two
patients, however, remained behaviorally in a VS.97
One patient in this group, who had been in a VS for five years, also
underwent a communication task using fMRI.98 He was asked specific yes or
no questions and instructed to think of one type of imagery for yes and
another for no.99 Remarkably, the patient responded accurately to five out of
six autobiographical questions he was asked, such as “Is your father’s name
Alexander?” (yes) and “Is your father’s name Thomas?” (no).100 The authors
concluded that although it was impossible to establish any communication

88
Adrian M. Owen, et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313
SCIENCE 1402, 1402 (2006).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Martin M. Monti, et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of
Consciousness, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 580 (2010).
93
Id. at 580.
94
Id. at 585.
95
Id. at 583.
96
Id. at 585.
97
Id.
98
Martin M. Monti, et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of
Consciousness, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED., at 580.
99
Id. at 585.
100
Id.
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with the patient at the bedside, there was “clear evidence that the patient was
aware and able to communicate. . . .”101
A recent electrophysiological study concluded that a subset of VS
patients may have the ability to “follow” movement commands.102 Using
motor imagery, sixteen patients confirmed with a diagnosis of VS were
instructed to imagine squeezing the right hand or wiggling the toes,
alternating with relaxation.103 EEG responses were recorded during the
tasks.104 Three of the sixteen patients (or nineteen percent) were repeatedly
and reliably able to generate appropriate EEG responses.105 The investigators
noted that even though these patients were not misdiagnosed as vegetative,
experienced evaluators had not been able to identify the “actual condition” of
these individuals using standard behavioral assessments.106 Of particular
concern, however, is that only seventy-five percent of healthy controls could
demonstrate motor awareness in the task, leading some experts to criticize
the data as unreliable.107
B. Functional Neuroimaging to Distinguish Disorders of Consciousness
Functional neuroimaging of auditory processing has also been used
to distinguish the VS from the MCS. In MCS patients subjected to complex
auditory stimuli, brain imaging showed widespread activation upon the
presentation of cries or the patient’s own name.108 Although MCS patients
showed responses in auditory processing areas similar to healthy controls, no
significant activation in higher order associative areas was found in VS
patients.109
Another group of MCS patients was scanned while recordings of
either meaningful speech or backwards speech were played.110 The MCS
subjects showed patterns of brain activity that were “remarkably similar” to
101
Id. The patient later underwent extensive behavior testing and was found to
exhibit some responses indicative of MCS rather than VS, but there was no way to determine
how long such responses were apparent. Id.
102
Damian Cruse, et al., Bedside Detection of Awareness in the Vegetative State:
A Cohort Study, 378 LANCET 2088, 2091 (2011).
103
Id. at 2089-90.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 2091.
106
Id. at 2092.
107
See, e.g., Andrew M. Goldfine et al., Correspondence, Bedside Detection of
Awareness In the Vegetative State, 379 LANCET 1701, 1701 (2012) (stating that known
alterations of brain function in VS and MCS patients along with the weak EEG signals in
healthy controls raised concerns about the study’s findings).
108
Mélanie Boly et al., Cerebral Processing of Auditory and Noxious Stimuli in
Severely Brain Injured Patients: Differences Between VS and MCS, 15 NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL
REHAB. 283, 286 (2005).
109
Id.
110
N.D. Schiff, et al., fMRI Reveals Large-Scale Network Activation in Minimally
Conscious Patients, 64 NEUROLOGY 514, 515–16 (2005).
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those demonstrated by healthy controls,111 suggesting that language
comprehension was preserved, at least to some degree, in these patients,
distinguishing them from VS patients.112
In a study utilizing PET scanning that compared VS and MCS
patients, the authors found significant changes in brain function in the MCS
patients during noxious stimulation.113 The higher-order areas of the brain
associated with the pain matrix activated in MCS patients by unpleasant
stimulation were substantially similar to the areas activated in healthy
controls.114 In contrast, activation in those same areas was not seen in VS
patients.115 The ability to perceive pain, therefore, is one more reason to
distinguish most VS patients from those in an MCS.
Electrophysiological approaches have also shown promise as a tool
in determining diagnosis and prognosis in those with impaired
consciousness.116 Such results may enable clinicians to predict future
functional improvement at an earlier point in time rather than relying solely
on behavioral assessments that can lead to a delayed diagnosis.117 For
example, using auditory cognitive ERPs, covert signs of awareness were
detected in a total LIS patient who appeared behaviorally comatose.118 The
patient was presented names, including her own name, and asked to either
count one target unfamiliar name or her own name.119 The patient’s
responses to this auditory stimulus, recorded by EEG, indicated that the
patient was able to consciously detect her own name.120 Fourteen days after
testing was completed, the first signs of consciousness were behaviorally
observed.121 The patient was transferred to a rehabilitation unit where she
progressively improved.122
C. Limitations of the Studies
What can we infer about these patients? Does an individual whose
scan shows islands of activity unequivocally possess a higher functioning
brain? If the findings are negative, does that indicate a complete absence of
consciousness? Before reaching such hasty conclusions, we need to
111

Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
113
Boly et al., supra note 73, at 1017.
114
Id. at 1018.
115
Id. This does not mean that VS patients may not experience pain; only that the
technique failed to detect activation of areas of the brain associated with the conscious
perception of pain. Id. at 1019.
116
See Gawryluk et al., supra note 80, at 6 (citing studies that demonstrated the
usefulness of ERPs in LIS patients).
117
Id.
118
Schnakers et al., supra note 37, at 272.
119
Id. at 273.
120
Id. at 275–76.
121
Id. at 272.
122
Id. at 272.
112
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acknowledge the limitations of functional neuroimaging and the realities of
what it can accomplish.
1. Research and Methodological Limitations
Studies using sophisticated brain scans to detect covert awareness in
patients in a VS, MCS, or LIS have been performed on a small number of
patients in only a few research centers. Neuroimaging as an aid in diagnosis
and prognosis is still in its infancy and it may be years before such research
is translated into a clinical setting.123 Although EEGs are in routine use and
are more transportable and cheaper than fMRI, ERPs to assess consciousness
are also in the investigational stages.124Large, multi-center studies with
standardized protocols will be necessary to validate the results of these
studies.125
There are also methodological limitations to fMRI. Analyzing
neuroimaging data in patients with impaired consciousness is challenging.126
Some brain lesions may interfere with the ability to follow commands even
though the patient may have some cognitive ability.127 Using fMRI to detect
evidence of consciousness requires prolonged attention.128 Since
consciousness may be episodic or inconsistent in some patients, repeated
testing may be necessary.129 Other drawbacks are technical, including the
possibility of false positives or misinterpretation of scan results due to patient
movement.130 Some patients have metal implants, making them inappropriate
candidates for fMRI, although suitable for EEG studies.131
2. Interpretation of Positive Findings
Positive findings of brain activity in the VS patient indicate several
possibilities: the patient has only automatic responses and no evidence of
awareness, the patient has minimal consciousness, i.e., is in an MCS rather

123

Fins et al., supra note 14, at 5.
Id.
125
Haibo Di et al., Neuroimaging Activation Studies In the Vegetative State:
Predictors Of Recovery?
8 CLINICAL. MED. 502, 506 (2008), available at http://www.coma.ulg.ac.be/
papers/vs/ClinMed_VS_2008.pdf.
126
Monti et al., supra note 50, at 87 (noting the difficulty and complexity of
acquiring and analyzing fMRI data in this population).
127
León-Carrión et al., supra note 69, at 565.
128
Id.
129
Id. (stating that patients may present only transient activity in response to
instructions); see also Monti et al., supra note 50, at 88 (recommending that patients with a
negative response be subjected to repeat testing at different times of the day or to testing with
different modalities).
130
Laureys et al., supra note 7, at 544.
131
Cruse et al, supra note 102, at 2088.
124
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than in a VS, or the patient is fully conscious and actually in complete LIS.132
The researchers who report activity in the areas of the brain that process
consciousness appear confident that the subjects possess subjective
awareness of themselves and their environment.133 Others, however, caution
that normal or near-normal activation in response to stimulation cannot be
considered as proof of consciousness in these patients.134
In particular, there is skepticism of brain imaging used to
demonstrate command-following. The Owen and Monti studies assume that
patients who demonstrate patterns of activity on scans when asked to
imagine activities or follow commands through imagery have conscious
awareness. Concerns have been raised that these studies are flawed and that
their findings are not proof of the presence of awareness but may only reflect
unconscious automatic reactions.135 Even healthy individuals, studies show,
are capable of subconsciously processing sensory information without
awareness.136 In addition, reports demonstrating speech recognition in MCS
patients may be dissociative of actual consciousness.137 Such patients may be
responding to stimuli but are not aware they are doing so. In other words, the
“light’s on, but is anybody home?”138
Further, the results may highlight only the misdiagnosis of disorders
of consciousness. In other words, the studies may indicate that a few patients
diagnosed in a VS may actually be in or emerging into an MCS state.139
Nevertheless, this could implicate a sizable number of patients. Although
132

D.J. Wilkinson et al., Functional Neuroimaging and Withdrawal of LifeSustaining Treatment from Vegetative Patients, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 508, 509 (2009), available
at http://jme.bmj.com/content/35/8/508.full.pdf+html.
133
See supra text accompanying notes 91, 101, 106.
134
E.g., M. Boly et al., When Thoughts Become Action: An fMRI Paradigm to
Study Volitional Brain Activity In Non-Communicative Brain Injured Patients, 36
979,
980
(2007),
available
at
NEUROIMAGE
http://www.wbic.cam.ac.uk/Members/cric/research/documents/boly-neuroimage2007.pdf/view (opining that the ability to respond to sensory stimulation is not proof of the
presence of awareness).
135
See Daniel L. Greenberg, Comment on “Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative
State,” 315 SCIENCE 1221 (2007) (stating that Owen’s single case study suffered from
“substantial flaws” and that it was not clear the tennis-imagining patient made any conscious
decisions); see also Nachev Parashkev & Husain Masud, Comment on “Detecting Awareness
in the Vegetative State,” 315 SCIENCE 1221 (2007) (arguing that Owen was making “radical
inferences” in interpreting data); see also Tshibanda et al., supra note 8 at 19–20 (stating that
the only thing that can be inferred from fMRI studies is that some patients can process sensory
stimuli).
136
See Neil Levy, Going Beyond the Evidence, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 19, 20 (2009)
(noting that even normal persons engage in mental tasks that are not conscious).
137
See Farah, supra note 48, at 18 (asserting that brain damage leads to
dissociation between cognition and awareness).
138
Robert Burton, The Light’s On, But Is Anybody Home, SALON (Sept. 25, 2007),
available at http://www.salon.com/2007/09/25/is_she_conscious/; see also Fisher &
Appelbaum, supra note 49, at 381 (stating that it may not be reasonable to assume that activity
in a brain region is associated with cognitive functioning).
139
Tshibanda et al., supra note 8, at 21.
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estimates vary widely, there may be more than 35,000 adult VS patients in
the United States140 and even more in MCS.141
Moreover, the studies should not be exaggerated to suggest that all
VS patients retain some semblance of consciousness. Only a small
proportion of VS patients, most of whom suffered a traumatic insult, have
demonstrated covert awareness. Those who suffered a nontraumatic (anoxic)
injury or who have been in a VS for more than one year are less likely to
have the potential for normal brain activation on neuroimaging.142
Further research may validate these early findings but, for now, it
may be premature to conclude that activation in some areas of the brain,
when given imagery or auditory tasks, definitively equates with
consciousness.143 Although the research is promising, the results are not yet
reliable enough for widespread use in clinical practice.
3. Interpretation of Negative Findings
Negative findings, or the absence of brain activation, in severely
brain-injured patients also need to be approached cautiously. From the
studies conducted so far, it is not possible to conclude emphatically that
negative findings reflect the absence of cognition.144 Some patients may have
been transiently unconscious or asleep during testing or the tasks may have
been too complex due to deficits in language comprehension, memory, or
decision making.145 The choice of experiment is also crucial to understanding
the results. For example, if a patient has abnormal auditory pathways, the use
of auditory stimuli to provoke a response is inappropriate.146 Methodological
limitations, discussed previously, may also limit the usefulness of negative
findings.147 Most important, studies have demonstrated false negatives even

140

See Fins et al, supra note 14, at 4 (citing to a study estimating a prevalence of
VS adults in the United States between 40 and 168 per million population).
141
Id.
142
Adrian M. Owen et al., Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging to
Detect Covert Awareness in the Vegetative State, 64 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 1098, 1101
(2007).
143
See Levy, supra note 136, at 20 (questioning whether the patient in Owen’s
2006 study was misdiagnosed as VS instead of MCS—if anything, the task was so complex
that if the study provided evidence of consciousness, the response was indicative of full-blown
consciousness).
144
See Owen, supra note 88, at 1402 (emphasizing that negative findings cannot
be used as evidence of a lack of awareness).
145
Monti et al., supra note 92, at 588; see also Owen et al., supra note 142, at
1101 (noting that patients may be asleep or may not have understood or heard the commands,
leading to false negative results).
146
Laureys, supra note 7, at 544.
147
See supra Part II.C.1.
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in healthy volunteers.148 Thus, “negative findings should never be taken as
evidence for a lack of mental activity.”149
IV. LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
The prospect of a subset of VS patients with undetected
consciousness raises legal and ethical ramifications for end-of-life decision
making. Does having covert signs of awareness give a patient greater legal
or moral status such that it is inappropriate to remove life-sustaining
treatments, such as artificial nutrition and hydration?150 Or, is the ability to
perceive suffering without the ability to express it a life not worth living?
A. Effect on the Legal System
Both legislatures and courts have been influenced by a view of the
VS as an irreversible, meaningless existence. As a result of the emerging
consensus after Quinlan that incompetent vegetative patients had a right to
forego life-sustaining care, all states enacted advance directive statutes.151
Under these laws, patients, while competent, may execute a directive setting
out their wishes regarding end-of-life care; they may also designate a health
care agent to make decisions for them when they lack decision-making
capacity.152 In the absence of an advance directive, family members or other
surrogates are instructed to make decisions based on the patient’s preferences
expressed while the patient was competent, a doctrine known as substituted
judgment.153 In some states, if the patient’s wishes cannot be discerned, a
decision about life-sustaining treatments may be made under a best-interest
standard.154 Most states allow surrogates and health care providers to make
end-of-life decisions in the clinical setting, but a few require court approval
in the absence of an advance directive.155
148

Monti, supra note 50, at 87; see also Cruse, supra note 102, at 2093 (noting
that three healthy volunteers could not produce significant EEG responses).
149
Monti, supra note 50, at 88.
150
See id. at 383; see also Barbara A. Wilson et al., Neuropsychological
Assessment and Management of People in States of Impaired Consciousness: An Overview of
Some Recent Studies, 9 BRAIN IMPAIRMENT 28, 29 (describing a case where a women was
found to be misdiagnosed in VS while undergoing assessment to determine if feeding and
hydration should be withdrawn. In a follow-up ten years later, she was living in the
community with constant support, but able to speak, initiate conversation, use an electric
wheelchair, drink through straw, and eat food).
151
ALAN MEISEL & KATHERINE L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 7.10 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2005-2012).
152
Id.
153
Id. at § 4.02 (discussing the substituted judgment standard).
154
Id. at § 4.07 (explaining the best interests standard).
155
Id. at § 3.03 (addressing the different settings in which end-of-life decisions are
made).
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Many advance directive statutes limit the class of persons from
whom life-sustaining care may be withheld or withdrawn to those in a
terminal illness or permanent unconsciousness, i.e., a permanent vegetative
state.156 For example, in Pennsylvania, a surrogate may authorize the
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures only from an incompetent patient
who has an end-stage disease or is “permanently unconscious.”157
Permanently unconscious is defined as:
A medical condition that has been diagnosed in accordance
with currently accepted medical standards and with
reasonable medical certainty as total and irreversible loss of
consciousness and capacity for interaction with the
environment. The term includes, without limitation, an
irreversible vegetative state or irreversible coma.158
Florida allows withdrawal or withholding of treatment by a surrogate
when the patient is diagnosed in a persistent vegetative state, which is
defined as “a permanent and irreversible condition of unconsciousness in
which there is [an] absence of voluntary action or cognitive behavior [and]
an inability to communicate or interact purposefully with the
environment.”159 Although advance directive statutes do not supplant
common law rights, they may constrain the right of patients and surrogates to
forgo life-sustaining care in disorders of consciousness other than an
irreversible coma or permanent vegetative state.160
Many courts, beginning with Quinlan, have also approached VS
patients differently than other impaired individuals when confronted with
requests to end life support. Judicial opinions largely reflect the clinical
assumption that VS involves a “special category of patients.”161 In
authorizing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining care, most
courts would probably agree that VS is a condition where “(p)ersonality,
memory, purposive action, social interaction, sentience, thought, and even
emotional states are gone.”162 Thus, the VS has become an important
diagnostic predicate on which to base legal decisions allowing caretakers or
surrogates to forego life-sustaining care.

156

Id. at §§ 7.06 [A], 8.03.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5456, 5461, 5462 (2005).
158
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5422 (2005).
159
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101(12) (West 2010).
160
Some advance directive statutes allow withdrawal of care from patients in an
end-stage condition, which includes advanced Alzheimer’s disease. Meisel & Cerminara,
supra note 151, at § 7.06 [A] [2].
161
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d. 1209, 1228 (N.J. 1985).
162
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 174-75 (1983)).
157
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On the other hand, courts have been careful to distinguish the VS
patient from the MCS patient, who has been conferred greater moral and
legal status.163 Several cases illustrate the tendency of courts to require
heightened procedural protections before life-sustaining care can be
withdrawn from non-VS patients. In In re Martin, the patient was described
as having minimal voluntary movements and consciousness to some extent,
but unable to communicate in any meaningful way.164 The patient’s wife
sought a court order to terminate all medical treatment, including artificial
nutrition and hydration, which was opposed by the patient’s mother and
sister.165 The court considered, but rejected, a best interests (objective)
standard for terminating treatment in favor of a subjective or substituted
judgment standard.166 Indicating, however, that the objective standard might
be appropriate for a VS patient, the court stated: “In the cases that have
applied a more objective test or suggested a more objective test would be
proper, the patient generally has been comatose or in a persistent vegetative
state.”167 The court did not explain, however, why there should be a
distinction between vegetative and minimally conscious patients when
choosing the appropriate test to apply in terminating life support.
Similarly, in Conservatorship of Wendland, the spouse conservator
sought to withdraw tube feedings from her husband who was in MCS.168
Because the patient was intermittently conscious, the conservator was
required to present clear and convincing evidence of his wishes to refuse lifesustaining treatment or that it was in his best interests to end his life, a
burden that could not be met in this case.169 The court was careful to
distinguish the right of surrogates to withdraw treatment from a person in an
MCS from one in a VS. The high evidentiary standard of clear and
convincing evidence would not be required for “permanently unconscious
patients, including those who are comatose or in a persistent vegetative
state.”170
More recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had the opportunity
to consider whether a guardian could exercise the right to refuse lifesustaining treatment on behalf of a profoundly retarded, never-competent
163
It is questionable whether there should be sharp distinctions drawn between VS
and MCS patients in end-of-life care. See Lawrence J. Nelson and Ronald E. Cranford,
Michael Martin and Robert Wendland: Beyond the Vegetative State, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 427, 446–47 (1999) (arguing that there are no valid legal or clinical reasons to
treat MCS patients differently than VS patients).
164
In re Martin, 538 N.W. 2d 399, 402-03 (1995), cert. denied sub nom. Martin v.
Martin, 516 U.S. 1113 (1996).
165
Id. at 402.
166
Id. at 408-09.
167
Id. at 408.
168
In re Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151,155 (Cal. 2001).
169
Id. at 166.
170
Id. at 175; see also In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67–68 (Wis. 1992) (refusing to
require clear and convincing proof of the wishes of an individual in VS).
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patient.171 The court concluded that, unless authorized by an advance
directive, life-preserving care must be provided to an individual who has
neither an end-stage medical condition nor is permanently unconscious.172
Case law and advance directive statutes reflect a broad societal view
that patients in a VS or in a state of permanent unconsciousness are
presumed to be in the category of persons for whom life-sustaining
procedures can be ethically withheld or withdrawn. Patients in a VS have
been not only clinically but also legally marginalized; they are among the
“almost dead.”173 But the emerging neuroscience indicates there may be
more blurring of the line between conscious and unconscious than previously
thought.174 If functional imaging to detect hidden awareness gains
widespread clinical acceptance, the evolving neuroscience may have a farreaching effect on how legal bodies define consciousness and approach endof-life decisions for this vulnerable population.175 If nothing else, the new
data on undetected consciousness should alert legislators and courts to
reconsider or question the inviolability of the VS diagnosis. Accurate
diagnosis of these patients is critical, as, under existing law, patients who
demonstrate some level of consciousness may move “from the ‘possibly
allowed to die’ category to the ‘not generally allowed to die’ category.”176
B. Effect on End-of-Life Decisions By Surrogates and Healthcare
Providers
Advances in neuroimaging have the potential to alter end-of-life
conversations between patients, their families, and their caretakers. Even if a
patient has an advance directive, such as a living will, it is unlikely the
patient will have considered the possibility that consciousness may exist on a
171
In re D.L.H., 2 A.3d 505, 506 (Pa. 2010), aff’g on other grounds 967 A.2d 971
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).
172
Id. at 515; see also Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Ky. 2004)
(construing state statute to allow the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining care only in
patients who are permanently unconscious or in a persistent vegetative state, or who are
expected to die within a few days); In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W. 2d 485, 491–92 (Wis. 1997),
cert. denied sub nom. Spahn v. Wittman, 522 U.S. 951 (1997) (refusing to allow guardian to
withdraw care from a patient who was not in a persistent vegetative state).
173
Some have argued that brain death should include those in VS because they
lack the consciousness required for a person to be considered living. See, e.g., Robert M.
Veatch, The Dead Donor Rule: True By Definition, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 10, 10-11 (2003).
174
Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 49, at 377. For a helpful summary of
definitions of unconsciousness used in state statutes, see id. at 383, Table 1.
175
See id. at 382 (arguing that statutory language used to define neurological
conditions and behaviors should be updated in light of neuroscientific advances).
176
David Cyranoski, Neuroscience: The Mind Reader, 486 NATURE 178, 180
(2012), available at http://www.nature.com/news/neuroscience-the-mind-reader-1.10816; see
also, e.g., In re Riley M, No. A-96-409, 1997 WL 133169, at *3 (Neb. Ct. App. March 25,
1997). In Riley, the court approved a DNR (“do not resuscitate) order for a two-year old in a
persistent vegetative state. While an appeal was pending, the diagnosis was changed because
of “marked changes” in the child’s condition making the DNR order inappropriate.
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continuum. In most cases, therefore, families and other surrogates will be
called on to choose whether life-supporting care should be terminated. The
emerging science will heighten expectations for some family members, and
perhaps even exaggerate those expectations. For others, the lack of objective
signs of awareness on brain imaging will be intensely disappointing.
Families are often faced with end-of-life options days or weeks after
a serious brain injury. At that point, however, it is impossible to predict with
any confidence whether the patient will evolve to MCS or a functional
recovery.177 Later on, when the diagnosis is clear, decisions to end a family
member’s life become more difficult as the patient may be breathing on his
own and the choice is often whether to remove a feeding tube. Reliable
diagnoses and prognoses are, therefore, profoundly important as families or
other caretakers consider whether to forego end-of-life procedures. Ethical
responsibilities require that families be provided with the full range of
choices available in determining whether to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment. “They are entitled to support and the exchange of
information that is both scientifically accurate and compassionately
communicated.”178
If neuroimaging lives up to its potential, it could be a valuable aid in
assessing early signs of consciousness in patients who are aware but cannot
demonstrate any motor behavior reflecting an ability to understand
commands or communicate.179 For example, studies indicating that MCS
patients have the ability to process language and speech, which one
prominent neurologist has called “spine-chilling,”180 are significant because
these patients have often been conflated with those in a VS and shunted off
to chronic care facilities without benefit of meaningful treatment and
rehabilitation.181
Families may also be provided with better prognostic information.182
If the developing science can be adapted for bedside use, it may help to
identify those patients who will emerge from a VS and respond to
rehabilitation intended to improve their mental state. Several studies have
shown that those few patients who exhibit signs of consciousness on imaging
are more likely later to exhibit behavioral signs of awareness.183 For
example, one study demonstrated that the higher the level of speech
177

See generally BERNAT, supra note 4, at 296–298 (discussing the limits of
prognostication in the VS and MCS states).
178
Fins et al., supra note 14, at 9.
179
See Tshabanda et al., supra note 8, at 20 (concluding that the new imaging
studies may be used to detect signs of consciousness that cannot be discerned in a
conventional assessment).
180
Fins, supra note 62, at 341.
181
Id. at 342.
182
Tshabanda et al, supra note 8, at 21 (suggesting that fMRI could be a marker of
prognosis).
183
See Di et al., supra note 125, at 506 (reviewing fifteen studies and concluding
that early activation of brain activity is a reliable marker of recovery).
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processing demonstrated by VS patients on fMRI, the more likely they were
to show improvement in their behavioral assessment six months later, often
leading to a changed diagnosis.184
Functional neuroimaging may also aid in assessing the effect of
treatment (as yet experimental) in those with impaired consciousness.185
There have been reports that certain drugs, such as amantadine or zolpidem
(Ambien), may temporarily improve awareness in VS and MCS patients.186
Not all patients respond to these drugs, however, and neuroimaging may
prove to be useful in selecting appropriate patients for these therapies.
Early diagnosis of patients with some level of consciousness is
particularly important for proper pain management.187 A correct diagnosis
may also guide clinicians to determine when pain relief should be provided
for patients in whom life-sustaining procedures patients are withdrawn.188
Some authors have raised the possibility of using functional neuroimaging to
ask patients if they are feeling pain.189 Even if such communication cannot
be established, the possibility of covert awareness in a minority of patients
and the high rate of diagnostic error suggest that all patients with impaired
consciousness, even those in an apparent VS, should receive pain
medication.190
More worrisome, if neuroscience progresses to the point where
clinicians using sophisticated brain imaging can communicate with a patient
who is unresponsive behaviorally, the next stage may be asking the patient
whether life-sustaining treatment should be continued or withdrawn.191 This
would be a precarious step. The doctrine of informed consent requires
patients to be competent to make health care decisions. Competency
encompasses not only the ability to communicate a choice, but also the

184
M. R. Coleman et al., Towards the Routine Use of Brain Imaging to Aid the
Clinical Diagnosis of Disorders of Consciousness, 132 BRAIN 2541, 2550 (2009) (reporting
that all but one out of eight VS patients who demonstrated a high level of auditory processing
during fMRI showed behavioral evidence of emergence to MCS six months later).
185
Di et al., supra note 125, at 506.
186
See, e.g., Caroline Schnakers et al., Measuring The Effect Of Amantadine In
Chronic Anoxic Minimally Conscious State, 79 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY
225, 226 (2008) (demonstrating the beneficial effect of amantadine in a single patient); see
also, e.g., Ralf Class & Wally Nel, Drug Induced Arousal From the Permanent Vegetative
State, 21 NEUROREHABILITATION 23, 24–25 (2006) (reporting arousal in three patients in a
permanent vegetative state with zolpidem).
187
See Laureys et al., supra note 40, at 506 (stressing the importance of early
diagnosis and pain management in LIS patients).
188
Fins et al., supra note 14, at 6 (suggesting that neuroimaging could be helpful
in assessing pain in individuals who have lost the ability to communicate).
189
Monti et al., supra note 92, at 589.
190
See Caroline Schnakers & Nathan D. Zasler, Pain Assessment and
Management in Disorders of Consciousness, 20 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROLOGY 620, 624
(2007) (suggesting that all patients in VS or MCS receive analgesics).
191
See Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 49, at 380 (envisioning using
neuroimaging methods to ask a patient if he wants to be removed from life support).
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ability to understand relevant information and to appreciate treatment
alternatives and their consequences.192
Brain scans alone cannot demonstrate competency and the cognitive
and emotional abilities to make such a complex decision may be out of reach
of these patients. Making an autonomous choice requires not only
comprehension but also the ability to judge the worth of treatment in
accordance with one’s own values and personal conscience. It is only
speculation whether patients who can minimally communicate via
neuroimaging possess that kind of sophisticated reasoning ability.
There are also risks in accepting technology as the final word in
assessing consciousness. Some families will almost surely request fMRI or
electrophysiological studies to confirm or challenge the VS diagnosis.
Assuming a dispute among family members or refusal by the attending
physician to order functional imaging, it is conceivable that there could be
court proceedings initiated to compel such testing. Indeed, that request was
made in the Schiavo case, where the parents retained experts who testified
that Schiavo was in an MCS rather than a VS.193 The court had before it CT
scans of the brain that demonstrated structural defects, but refused to order
an fMRI, which the parents hoped would demonstrate evidence of conscious
activity.194
In 2005, at the time of the Schiavo case, and even today, fMRI
suggestions of consciousness in an otherwise behaviorally unresponsive
patient are not ready for the spotlight of the courtroom. It is unlikely that this
emerging technology would meet the standards for scientific reliability
established in federal and state courts under Daubert195 and its progeny.196 If
the studies are validated in larger clinical populations, however, they can be
expected to provoke courtroom controversies over diagnosis in end-of-life
care.
Outside the realm of family disputes, there may be overreliance on
the diagnostic use of advanced neuroimaging techniques. The means to
determine whether conscious functions of the brain have irreversibly ceased
have largely been behavioral observations, which as previously noted, can be
challenging.197 Technical “answers” to whether a patient has undetected
consciousness may be tantalizingly persuasive to family members and
clinicians, even if the science is still elusive. In a recent case pending in
British Columbia, the parents of a man diagnosed in VS have asked the court
192

See Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence; Formulating
Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS. L. REV. 345, 351
(discussing Appelbaum and Grisso’s competence standards).
193
Order at 4-6, In re Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Fla. Pinellas Cnty. Ct.
March 9, 2005), available at http://abstractappeal.com/schiavo/trialctorder030905.pdf.
194
Id.
195
Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
196
See Fisher & Appelbaum, supra note 49, at 381-82 (discussing the
admissibility of neuroimaging data).
197
See supra Part II.C.
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to keep their son alive so that he can participate in one of Owen’s studies to
assess covert consciousness in severely brain-damaged patients.198 The wellknown “CSI effect” informs us that lay people have high expectations for
scientific, objective evidence, including fMRI.199 The presence or hope of
conscious activity on brain scans or EEGs may lead not only families, but
also health care providers, down the path of overreliance on neuroimaging
technology, without consideration of its limitations and experimental
posture. False hope for the families of those with severe brain injuries like
VS may be worse than no hope at all.
On the other hand, if brain scans can reliably rule out conscious
thoughts or perceptions, does that render the withdrawal or withholding of
life-sustaining procedures even more ethically justifiable? The absence of
any conscious activity on neuroimaging may give voice to the notion that
further treatment is medically “futile.” The debate about end-of-life care has
gradually shifted from the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment the patient
or surrogate deems futile to the obligation to provide care the physician
deems futile.200 These reverse end-of-life cases raise questions about whether
the surrogate of an incompetent VS patient has the right to demand lifepreserving care over the health care provider’s objections.201 If functional
neuroimaging tests repeatedly demonstrate a complete lack of brain activity
diagnostic of awareness, the findings may give health care providers further
persuasive tools to contend that life-prolonging care is futile.
The concept of futility also raises broader issues concerning the just
allocation of healthcare resources. Some commentators argue that society
should not use finite resources to keep alive those who are in a VS and
unable to meaningfully interact with their environment, caretakers, and
family.202 Veatch and Spicer propose that if there is community consensus,
reimbursement for life-sustaining care of those in a persistent vegetative state
198
Ian Mulgrew, Family Fights Over of Severely Brain Injured Man, VANCOUVER
SUN,
Dec.
5,
2012,
available
at
http://www.vancouversun.com/health/
Family+fights+over+fate+severely+brain+injured/7653097/story.html#ixzz2EC1HfuPR.
199
See David P. McCabe et al., The Influence of fMRI Lie Detection Evidence on
Juror-Decision-Making, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 566, 574 (reporting that fMRI evidence
indicating the defendant is lying may be more persuasive to potential jurors than other
evidence of lying).
200
See generally Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe
Harbor To Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2007).
201
Id.
202
See, e.g., Jacob M. Appel, Rational Rationing vs. Irrational Rationing: The
Struggle for the Legacy of Reuben Bentancourt, HUFFINGTON POST (June 23, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacob-m-appel/rational-rationing-vs-irr_b_622057.html
(arguing that VS patients should be viewed differently than other patients and that scarce
resources should not be committed to prolonging their lives); see also Catherine Constable,
Withdrawal of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration for Patients in a Permanent Vegetative
State: Changing Tack, 26 BIOETHICS 157, 162 (2012) (arguing there should be a presumption
to withdraw life-sustaining in VS patients, in part because resources should be allocated to
those who can benefit from them).
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should end at three months of care.203 Batavia argues that a rationing scheme
based on medical futility should focus on the permanently unconscious,
defined as a lack of consciousness for one year.204 In today’s cost-conscious
heath care environment, it is possible to envision a rationing agenda that
relies on adjuvant neuroimaging to “rule out” consciousness in an effort to
justify an end of funding for life-prolonging care.
Finally, the presence of sensory or cognitive processing in the lives
of seriously brain-damaged individuals raises larger philosophical questions
about the impact this small subset of VS patients with covert consciousness
will have on end-of-life decisions. Is the ability to follow simple commands
indicative of a “meaningful” life? Can families or other surrogates discern
whether the patient would have wanted to opt for any life, or object to the
“prison” of MCS?205 In fact, given the likelihood that patients with minimal
or intermittent awareness experience pain, it may be worse to be partially
conscious. Further, there is no assurance, even with aggressive care, that a
person in a VS who demonstrates minimal awareness will ever be able to
achieve a recovery beyond a severe disability.206 What good is knowing an
individual has islands of brain activity if there is little or no possibility he
will emerge from that state to be able to interact with his caretakers or
family? Indeed, some might conclude that a state of partially preserved
cognition without a means of expression is a “life worse than death.”207 A
better understanding of consciousness will inform this debate.
V. CONCLUSION
Functional neuroimaging needs to be cautiously interpreted, but may
open a window into how much awareness is possible in a person in a
vegetative or minimally conscious state. The data are preliminary and
families need transparency about the limits of diagnosing or prognosticating
on the basis of brain scans alone. At the very least, patients and their families
should be informed of the shortcomings of the neuroscience and that case
reports of awareness in a very small proportion of VS and MCS patients are
investigational and unlikely to predict whether a particular individual will
benefit from high-tech neuroimaging tools. Inevitably, as the technology
advances, the ability to assess cognitive awareness will improve, leading to
203
Robert M. Veatch & Carol Mason Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of
the Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 15, 30 (1992).
204
Andrew I. Batavia, Disability Versus Futility in Rational Health Care Services:
Defining Medical Futility Based on Permanent Unconsciousness—PVS, Coma and
Anencephaly, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 219, 229 (2002).
205
Robert T. Knight, Consciousness Unchained: Ethical Issues and the Vegetative
State and Minimally Conscious State, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2008).
206
See Wilkinson et al., supra note 132 at 509 (stating there are no reports of VS
patients identified as conscious on neuroimaging who made a recovery to functional
independence).
207
Id. at 510.
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better diagnoses and outcomes in those with disorders of consciousness. This
should help patients, families, physicians, and the courts, when necessary, to
make better end-of-life decisions.
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